

In order to get even this close, his units had to rush southward, and were now spread out over a long line running southward from just east of Königsberg. When Rennenkampf was finally ordered to go to Samsonov's aid, it was too late.īy the time the battle proper ended on 30 August (Samsonov disappeared, a probable suicide, on 29 August), the closest of Rennenkampf's units, his II Corps, was still over 45 miles (70 km) from the pocket. In their memoirs, neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff mention the alleged feud. The official Russian inquiry about their disaster in East Prussia blamed the general commanding the two armies, Yakov Zhilinsky. Hoffmann claimed that, therefore, the two Russian generals would never cooperate. The commander of the Second Army, Alexander Samsonov, had publicly criticized Rennenkampf some years earlier (about the Battle of Mukden in 1905), and it was rumored that the two had come to blows over the matter. Hoffmann claimed also that the German success was made possible, in part, due to the personal enmity between the Russian generals, which he had learned about as an observer in the Russo-Japanese War. Regardless of authorship, the plan was quickly implemented, culminating in the destruction of the Second Army at the Battle of Tannenberg between 26 and 30 August 1914. His commanders in the German Eighth Army, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, also claimed credit. German Colonel Max Hoffmann claimed that he developed a plan to encircle the Second Army as it maneuvered north over some particularly hilly terrain. Meanwhile, the Russian Second Army invaded from the south, hoping to cut the Germans off in the area around the city. The Russian offensive in East Prussia had started well enough, with General Paul von Rennenkampf's First Army (Army of the Neman) forcing the Germans westward from the border towards Königsberg.
